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Preface 
An economic approach to the problem of measuring the relative 
6'  power" or "value" of members in a decision making body is to ask how 
much the various members would be paid by outside agents trying to  
manipulate the outcome. A particular case is that in which there are 
two competing agents, or lobbyists, on opposite sides of the issue. A model 
of competition is developed that leads to a class of two-person zero sum 
games that are related to so-called Colonel Blotto games. These have 
potential application to a wide variety of problems in which two opponents 
compete for the control of certain targets. 

Summary 
Some basic solution properties and anomalies are investigated for a class 
of tactical games related to  so-called Colonel Blotto games. In this model 
two agents compete for control of players in a given n-person simple game. 
I t  is shown that equilibrium solutions-even in mixed strategies-do not 
always exist. The case where the opponents have substantially unequal 
resources is solved and shown to attribute values to the players in the 
original n-person game that are in the least core. Some approximate 
values for particular cases where resources are equal are also cited. 

A ~ a c t i c a l  Lobbying Game 
Two l o b b y i s t s ,  having e q u a l  b u d g e t s ,  approach  a  l e g i s l a t u r e  
( o r  a  commit tee)  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  of  buying v o t e s .  W e  imagine t h a t  
t h e  l o b b y i s t s  a r e  on o p p o s i t e  s i d e s  o f  an i s s u e :  A wants  t h e  
measure  t o  p a s s ,  B wants  it t o  f a i l .  L o b b y i s t  A o f f e r s  amount 
x  t o  v o t e r  i and B o f f e r s  y i ,  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  budge t  c o n s t r a i n t s  i 1 x .  < a  and yi 5 a  ( a  > 0 ) .  Ne assume t h a t  t h e  b u d g e t s  a r e  1 = 
c o m p l e t e l y  d i v i s i b l e .  I f  xi > yi t h e n  A g a i n s  c o n t r o l  o f  v o t e r  
i, i f  y .  > xi  t h e n  B g a i n s  c o n t r o l  o f  i, and i f  x .  = yi  t h e r e  i s  1 
a  s t a n d o f f  o r  " t i e "  f o r  t h a t  v o t e r .  L e t  t h e  set o f  v o t e r s  be 
d e s i g n a t e d  by N = { 1 , 2 ,  ..., n ) ,  and t h e  v o t i n g  p r o c e d u r e  by t h e  
c o l l e c t i o n  S o f  winning s e t s .  W e  a d o p t  t h e  u s u a l  c o n v e n t i o n  
t h a t  
and S  E S and S  5 T  i m p l i e s  T  E S . 
Then A wins (and  B l o s e s )  i f   EN : x  > y i )  E S; s i m i l a r l y  B wins i 
(and A l o s e s )  i f   EN : xi 2 y i )  4 S. W e  a t t a c h  a  v a l u e  o f  +1 t o  
winn ing ,  -1 t o  l o s i n g .  I f  t h e r e  is  a  t i e  f o r  some v o t e r ,  we may 
c o n s i d e r  t h a t  he  w i l l  go e i t h e r  way w i t h  a  50-50 p r o b a b i l i t y .  Thus, 
g i v e n  payment v e c t o r s  x  = ( x l  , x 2 , .  . . , x n )  and y  = ( y ,  , y 2 , .  . . , yn)  by 
- - 
A and B r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  l e t  wA be t h e  number o f  winning,  wB t h e  num- 
b e r  o f  l o s i n g ,  s e t s  S  such t h a t  x i z y i  f o r  a l l  i € S  and x i z y i  
f o r  a l l  i 4 s .+ Then t h e  e x p e c t e d  p a y o f f s  t o  A and B  w i l l  b e  
v  (x, y )  - = (wA-wB) / (wA+wB) and  -v (:, y ) =  (w -w ) / (wA+wB) . 
- - B A 
S t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g  p a y o f f s  s h o u l d  be t a k e n  n e t  o f  c o s t s .  
However, i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  l o b b y i n g ,  winn ing  o r  l o s i n g  is 
 he a u t h o r  w i s h e s  t o  thank  R.J. Weber f o r  p o i n t i n g  o u t  a  s l i p  
i n  a n  e a r l i e r  v e r s i o n  o f  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  [ a ] .  
assumed t o  be of incomparably g r e a t e r  va lue  t han  t h e  p r i c e s  p a i d ,  
s o  t h a t  f o r  most purposes t h e  c o s t s  can be suppressed .  
We c a l l  t h e  games d e f i n e d  by t h e  payoff  func t ion  ( 1 )  t a c t i c a l  
l o b b y i n g  games .  This  c l a s s  o f  games was i n t roduced  i n  [ E l  a s  a  
s p e c i f i c  model of  p o l i t i c a l  lobbying;  and a l s o  a s  a  g e n e r a l  model 
f o r  imputing v a l u e s  t o  t h e  v o t e r s  i n  a  v o t i n g  game ( i . e . ,  a  s imple  
game) . A r e l a t e d  formula t ion  o f  a  lobbying  game t h a t  a p p l i e s  t o  
a  whole l e g i s l a t i v e  s e s s i o n  r a t h e r  t han  " b i l l  by b i l l "  i s  devel -  
oped i n  [51. When only  one l o b b y i s t  a t t e m p t s  t o  buy vo te s  a  
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  model and a  d i f f e r e n t  concept  of v a l u e  r e s u l t  [ 6 ] .  
The purpose of t h i s  n o t e  i s  t o  p o i n t  o u t  s e v e r a l  i n t e r e s t -  
i ng  f e a t u r e s  of t a c t i c a l  lobbying games, and t o  mention some 
unsolved problems r ega rd ing  them. 
The f i r s t  example o f  a  t a c t i c a l  lobbying  game seems t o  
have been cons idered  by Bore1 [ I ] ,  who formula ted  it a s  a  
problem of  defense .  I n  B o r e l ' s  example, t h r e e  " p o i n t s "  a r e  
t o  be defended a g a i n s t  an "agg res so r " ,  each deploying  t h e  same 
number o f  f o r c e s .  The a g g r e s s o r ' s  o b j e c t i v e  may be formula ted  
i n  e i t h e r  of  two ways: (i) maximize t h e  expected number of  
p o i n t s  cap tu red ;  o r  (ii) maximize t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  a  
m a j o r i t y  of  p o i n t s  a r e  cap tu red .  For t h r e e  p o i n t s ,  and wi th  
e q u a l  budgets ,  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  amount e s s e n t i a l l y  t o  t h e  same 
t h i n g ,  s i n c e  ( excep t  f o r  t i e s )  each p l a y e r  w i l l  c a p t u r e  a t  
l e a s t  one b u t  no more than  two p o i n t s .  
Subsequently,  t h i s  t y p e  o f  game was g e n e r a l i z e d ,  us ing  t h e  
first o b j e c t i v e  o n l y ,  by Tukey and o t h e r s  [ 2 , 3 , 4 ] ,  t o  so -ca l l ed  
"Colonel  B l o t t o "  games. I n  Colonel  B l o t t o  games, a  weight  wi 
i s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  each p o i n t  and t h e  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  maximize 
t h e  t o t a l  expec ted  weight  of  t h e  p o i n t s  cap tu red .  Gross [ 2 ]  
and Gross and Wagner [ 31 showed t h a t  such games always have 
an e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  ( i n  mixed s t r a t e g i e s )  and gave v a r i o u s  
methods f o r  c o n s t r u c t i n g  s o l u t i o n s .  Unfo r tuna t e ly ,  excep t  f o r  
s p e c i a l  c a s e s  ( a s  i n  t h a t  mentioned above of t h r e e  p o i n t s  of 
equa l  weight )  t h e s e  s o l u t i o n s  do n o t  work f o r  lobbying games. 
I n d e e d ,  l o b b y i n g  games may be  viewed a s  a  d i f f e r e n t  way o f  
g e n e r a l i z i n g  B o r e l ' s  o r i g i n a l  i d e a  by u s i n g  t h e  second t y p e  
o f  o b j e c t i v e  d e f i n e d  above ,  and t h e i r  b e h a v i o r  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  t h a n  t h a t  o f  C o l o n e l  B l o t t o  games. The most 
e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  from Colone l  B l o t t o  games i s ,  a s  we s h a l l  
p r e s e n t l y  show, t h a t  an e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  does n o t  always 
e x i s t .  T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  c a n  a r i s e  i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  where t h e  
r o l e s  o f  t h e  " a g g r e s s o r "  and t h e  " d e f e n d e r "  a r e  n o t  symmetr ic .  
(Note  t h a t  Colone l  B l o t t o  games a r e  a lways  symmetr ic  f o r  t h e  
two p r o t a g o n i s t s ,  g i v e n  t h a t  t h e y  have  e q u a l  r e s o u r c e s . )  
To i l l u s t r a t e  what s o r t  o f  b e h a v i o r  can  b e  e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  
l o b b y i n g  games, we w i l l  c o n s i d e r  v a r i o u s  s i m p l e  games r on t h r e e  
v o t e r s .  L e t  t h e  t h r e e  v o t e r s  be deno ted  1 , 2 , 3 .  A m i . z ~ J  
s t r a t e g y  of  a  l o b b y i s t  w i l l  be  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  rep-  
r e s e n t e d  by a  p r o b a b i l i t y  measure  LI on t h e  B o r e l  s e t s  i n  t h e  
s i m p l e x  
!! = {X = ( X ~ . X ~ ~ X , ,  j O r  l x i  = I )  , ,,(?) J 1 , 
The payof f  f u n c t i o n  v ( x , y )  f o r  t h i s  c l a s s  o f  games i s  
bounded and B o r e l  m e a s u r a b l e  s o  t h e  i n t e g r a l s  / v ( x , y ) d p  a r e  
X - 
d e f i n e d .  W e  s a y  ( v , v )  is an equiZ ibr ium pa ir  - o f  mixed s t r a t -  
e g i e s  i f  f o r  e v e r y  x 0  and E X  w e  have 
I f  v o t e r  1  i s  a  d i c t n t o r ,  i . e . ,  i f  1 ' s  a s s e n t  is  n e c e s s a r y  
and s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p a s s  a  measure ,  t h e n  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  v o t e r s  a r e  
dummies and n o t h i n g  can be  g a i n e d  by b r i b i n g  them. Hence t h e  
un ique  e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  i s  f o r  b o t h  l o b b y i s t s  A and B t o  
spend  a l l  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  on v o t e r  1 ,  and t h e  game h a s  a  s o l u t i o n  
i n  p u r e  s t r a t e g i e s .  C l e a r l y  t h e  same r e s u l t  h o l d s  whenever t h e  
v o t i n g  game r h a s  a  d i c t a t o r .  
Suppose on t h e  o t h e r  hand t h a t  t h e  a s s e n t  o f  a l l  t h r e e  
v o t e r s  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  p a s s .  Then l o b b y i s t  A h a s  a  much more 
d i f f i c u l t  j o b  t o  succeed  t h a n  d o e s  B.  Indeed ,  no m a t t e r  what 
p u r e  s t r a t e g y  A u s e s  h e  w i l l  a lways  l o s e  a t  l e a s t  one v o t e r  
u n l e s s  it happens t h a t  B i s  u s i n g  e x a c t l y  t h e  same p u r e  s t r a t e g y .  
T h e r e f o r e  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  B s h o u l d  employ a  measure  v on 5 s u c h  
t h a t  t h e  measure  o f  any s i n g l e  p o i n t  i s  z e r o .  I n  t h a t  c a s e  any 
s t r a t e g y  o f  A w i l l  f a i l  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  1 ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  game h a s  
a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  ( i n  f a c t ,  a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  e q u i l i b r i a )  
c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a  mixed s t r a t e g y  f o r  B and a  p u r e  s t r a t e g y  f o r  A 
(namely x = g )  . 
W e  s a y  t h a t  a  v o t e r  i s  a  v e t o  pZayer  i f  h i s  a s s e n t  is  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  win,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  he i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  e v e r y  winning 
s e t .  G e n e r a l i z i n g  from t h e  above  example ,  i f  t h e r e  a r e  two o r  
more v e t o  p l a y e r s ,  t h e n  t h e  l o b b y i n g  game h a s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  
s o l u t i o n  i n  which B wins  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  1 .  The t h r e e - p e r s o n  
game hav ing  two v e t o  p l a y e r s  and one dummy is  handled  i n  t h i s  way 
I f  r i s  t h e  game o f  s i m p l e  m a j o r i t y  r u l e  on 
t h r e e  v o t e r s ,  t h e n  t h e  l o b b y i n g  game is  symmetr ic  
f o r  A and B and t h e r e  a r e  an i n f i n i t e  number o f  d i f f e r e n t  e q u i -  
l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n s ,  a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  by Gross  and Wagner [ 3 ]  . 
One s u c h  s o l u t i o n  is  t o  e r e c t  a  hemisphere  on  a  c i r c l e  i n s c r i b e d  
i n  5 and t o  c o n s i d e r  a  u n i f o r m  d i s t r i b u t i o n  on t h e  hemisphere :  
t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  o n t o  5 c o n s t i t u t e s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  mixed 
s t r a t e g y  f o r  b o t h  l o b b y i s t s  ( F i g u r e  1 ) .  O t h e r  s o l u t i o n s  e x i s t ,  
however,  i n  which t h e  s u b s e t  of  p u r e  s t r a t e g i e s  used h a s  an 
a r b i t r a r i l y  s m a l l  a r e a  [31 . 
A'S STRATEGY B 's STRATEGY 
Figure 1 
The o n l y  o t h e r  c a s e  t o  c o n s i d e r  f o r  t h r e e - p e r s o n  games i s  
t h a t  where t h e  minimal winning sets have t h e  form ( 1 , 2 }  and ( 1 , 3 } .  
Then v o t e r  1 i s  a v e t o  p l a y e r  b u t  n o t  a  d i c t a t o r ,  and t h e  asso-  
c i a t e d  lobbying  game is  n o t  symmetr ic  f o r  A and B .  I n  t h i s  
c a s e  we a s s e r t  t h a t  no e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  e x i s t s  even i n  
mixed s t r a t e g i e s .  The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  i s ,  r o u g h l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
t h a t  b o t h  B and A want t o  spend an a r b i t r a r i l y  l a r g e  p a r t  o f  
t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  on v o t e r  1 ,  b u t  n o t  a22 t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s .  
Suppose,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  and t h a t  A 
s u c c e e d s  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  p. For  any p u r e  s t r a t e g y  o f  B ,  such 
a s  y1  i n  F i g u r e  2 ,  A wins  o n l y  w i t h  s t r a t e g i e s  i n  t h e  shaded 
a r e a ;  hence  A p l a y s  s t r a t e g i e s  i n  t h i s  a r e a  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  
a t  l e a s t  p.  
Figure 2 
But a  s i m i l a r  a n a l y s i s  h o l d s  f o r  y 2  ( F i g u r e  3 )  - I n  f a c t  
we may f i n d  an i n f i n i t e  sequence  of  p o i n t s  c o n v e r g i n g  t o  ( 1 , 0 , 0 )  
such  t h a t  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  shaded a r e a s  a r e  disjoint. 
Figure 3 
rn l hus  p  = 0. ~ u t  f o r  any mixed s t r a t e g y  o f  B, A always has  
an opposing s t r a t e g y  t h a t  d o e s  succeed w i t h  p o s i t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y .  
Hence t h e r e  can be no equ i l i b r i um.  The g e n e r a l  proof  of  non- 
e x i s t e n c e  when t h e r e  i s  a  s i n g l e  v e t o  p l a y e r  who i s  n o t  a  
d i c t a t o r  is g iven  below. 
Our o b s e r v a t i o n s  may be  summarized i n  t h e  fo l l owing  
theorem. 
Theorem I Let  r be  a  s imple  game, G t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  
t a c t i c a l  lobbying  game. 
(i) I f  r has  a  d i c t a t o r  i t hen  xi = y .  = 1 1 
g i v e s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  f o r  G 
i n  pu re  s t r a t e g i e s .  
(ii) I f  r has  a  s e t  V of a t  l e a s t  two v e t o  
p l a y e r s  then  ( O , v )  is  an e q u i l i b r i u m  p a i r  
f o r  G f o r  any v s a t i s f y i n g  
v ( { y E 5 : y i =  O f o r  a l l  i y ~ l )  = 1  and 
- 
v ( y )  = 0  f o r  a l l  y  E X .  
- - - 
(iii) I f  r has  e x a c t l y  one v e t o  p l a y e r  who 
i s  n o t  a  d i c t a t o r ,  t hen  t h e r e  i s  no 
e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  f o r  G .  
Proof: The t r u t h  o f  ( i )  and (i i)  was n o t e d  above,  s o  it r e m a i n s  
o n l y  t o  e s t a b l i s h  ( i i i ) .  
L e t  r be a  v o t i n g  game on v o t e r s  { 1 , 2 ,  ..., n )  and suppose  
t h a t  v o t e r  1  i s  a  v e t o  p l a y e r  b u t  n o t  a  d i c t a t o r .  Suppose 
f u r t h e r ,  by way o f  c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  t h a t  ( u , v )  i s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  
p a i r  f o r  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  lobby ing  game G .  L e t  p  be  A ' s  expec-  
t a t i o n  o f  s u c c e s s  under  t h i s  Suppose f i r s t  t h a t  p  > 0 .  
For  each  E > 0 d e f i n e  = ( 1 - c t E / ( n - 1 ) ,  . . . , E / ( n - l ) )  and l e t  DE 
be  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  5 E 5 such  t h a t  i f  A p l a y s  5 and B  p l a y s  yE, 
- 
t h e n  A h a s  a  p o s i t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  s u c c e s s .  E v i d e n t l y ,  




x  1 y; = 1 f o r a t  l e a s t o n e  j # 1  . 3 - 
S i n c e  l x i  = 1 ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  
X 
E 
1  1  - - 1  < 1 - / n  f o r  a l l  x E D~ . 
- 
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
But  t h e n  by ( 1 )  t h e  measure  of t h e  set  DE U DEh U DEIn, U . . . 
i s  unbounded, a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  Hence p  = 0.  
Now c o n s i d e r  B ' s  mixed s t r a t e g y  v .  L e t  E  = {y: y l  5 1-E)  E .. 
and suppose  t h a t  f o r  some E > 0 ,  
( 3 )  U ( E E )  > 0 . 
 his i s  g e n e r a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  t h a n  A ' s  e x p e c t e d  n u m e r i c a l  p a y o f f .  
L e t  p* c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  un i fo rm d e n s i t y .  Given any y  - E  E, 
l e t  yk be  t h e  maximum among a l l  y .  1' i # 1 .  Then yk 2 t / ( n  - 1 ) .  
S i n c e  1 i s  t h e  u n i q u e  v e t o  p l a y e r ,  t h e r e  is  a  winning s e t  S 
n o t  c o n t a i n i n g  k .  We may t h e r e f o r e  c o n s t r u c t  v a r i o u s  5 s u c h  
t h a t  xi > yi f o r  a l l  i E S.  I n  f a c t ,  l e t  6 = ~ / ( n - l ) ~  and 
Then p*(Zy)  2 c  > 0  f o r  some s u i t a b l e  c o n s t a n t  c  > 0. 
Thus i f   p plays i n s t e a d  t h e  mixed s t r a t e g y  p*, t h e n  A s u c c e e d s  
w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  a t  l e a s t  cbn- '  > 0  a g a i n s t  any  y  GEE.  
S i n c e  by assumpt ion  B p l a y s  i n  E  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  v ( E E )  > 0 ,  
E 
it f o l l o w s  t h a t  ( p * , v )  g i v e s  a  p o s i t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s u c c e s s  
t o  A ,  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  ( p , ~ )  i s  an e q u i l i b r i u m .  
T h e r e f o r e  v ( E  ) = 0  f o r  a l l  E > 0. But  t h e n  v ( 1 , 0 , .  .. , 0 )  = 1 ,  
E 
s o  A can  s w i t c h  from p and p l a y  t h e  p u r e  s t r a t e g y  ( 1 , 0 , .  . . , 0 )  
w i t h  a  p o s i t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s u c c e s s  ( b e c a u s e  o f  o u r  conven- 
t i o n  on r e s o l v i n g  t i e s ) ,  a g a i n  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
( p , ~ )  i s  an e q u i l i b r i u m .  Hence no e q u i l i b r i u m  e x i s t s . 0  
I f  an e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  ( p , ~ )  t o  t h e  t a c t i c a l  l o b b y i n g  
game d o e s  e x i s t ,  v a l u e s  may be  imputed t o  t h e  v o t e r s  i n  t h e  
v o t i n g  game by c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  e x p e c t e d  amounts t h e y  a r e  o f f e r e d ,  
T h i s  v a l u e ,  when it e x i s t s ,  w i l l  be  c a l l e d  a  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  v o t i n g  game. N o t i c e  t h a t  when t h e r e  i s  
a  d i c t a t o r ,  a l l  t h e  v a l u e  i s  a s c r i b e d  t o  him. I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
two o r  more v e t o  p l a y e r s ,  however,  t h e  v a l u e  i s  i n  some s e n s e  
j n d e t e r m i n a t e .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  one  v e t o  p l a y e r  who i s  n o t  a  
d i c t a t o r ,  t h e  v a l u e  i s  u n d e f i n e d ,  a l t h o u g h  a  c a s e  can be  made 
t h a t  i n  some s e n s e  t h e  v e t o  p l a y e r  s h o u l d  r e c e i v e  an a r b i t r a r i l y  
l a r g e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e ,  though n o t  a l l  o f  it.  Excep t  
f o r  t h e  c a s e  when t h e r e  i s  a m u l t i p l i c i t y  of v e t o  p l a y e r s  t h e  
v a l u e  of a  dummy i s  z e r o ,  whenever t h e  v a l u e  i s  d e f i n e d .  
One problem w i t h  t h i s  v a l u e  i s  t h a t  t h e  e x p l i c i t  computa- 
t i o n  of  e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n s  f o r  any b u t  t h e  s m a l l e s t  games 
seems t o  be d i f f i c u l t .  A second problem, a l r e a d y  no ted  wi th  
r e s p e c t  t o  games having a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  v e t o  p l a y e r s ,  i s  
t h a t  t h e r e  may be s e v e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n s  t h a t  y i e l d  
d i f f e r e n t  noncoopera t ive  v a l u e s .  
I t  i s  worthwhile  t o  n o t e  t h a t  i f  ( v l r v 2 ,  ..., v n )  = y i s  a 
nonc oope ra t i ve  va lue  f o r  r a s  i n  (41, s a y  y i s  o b t a i n e d  from 
e q u i l i b r i u m  p a i r  ( u , v ) ,  and i f  v '  i s  a n o t h e r  v a l u e  o b t a i n e d  from 
- 
( u '  , v ' ) ,  t h e n  ( X u  + (1 - X ) u '  , Xv + (1 - X ) v l )  is a l s o  an e q u i l i b r i u m  
p a i r ,  s o  Xv + (1 - A )  v '  i s  a l s o  a  noncoopera t ive  v a l u e .  Thus t h e  
- -. 
c o l l e c t i o n  of  a l l  noncoopera t ive  v a l u e s  f o r  r forms a  c o n v e x  s e t .  
A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  c o r e  and o t h e r  s o l u t i o n  c o n c e p t s ,  any i m -  
p u t a t i o n  i n  t h i s  set  could  be cons ide r ed  i n  some s ens e  a s  a  
p l a u s i b l e  impu ta t i on  o f  va lue  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s  f o r  t h e  game T .  
However, n o t i c e  t h a t  t h e  set  o f  noncoopera t ive  v a l u e s  may n o t  
be a  c l o s e d  convex s e t .  T h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  
t h r e e -pe r son  v o t i n g  game r e q u i r i n g  unanimi ty  f o r  A ,  where ( up  
t o  a  m u l t i y l e )  any v e c t o r  e x c e p t  t h o s e  t h a t  a s c r i b e  a l l  v a l u e  
t o  one p l a y e r  i s  a noncoopera t ive  v a l u e .  
I n s t e a d  of  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  compute t h e  noncoope r a t i ve  v a l u e  
e x p l i c i t l y  by i n t e g r a t i o n ,  a  u s e f u l  approach i s  t o  approximate 
t h e  c on t i nuous  s t r a t e g y  spac e s  by a  f i n i t e  g r i d .  A n a t u r a l  way 
t o  do t h i s  i s  by a l l o c a t i n g  a  l a r g e  b u t  f i n i t e  number u o f  i n -  
d i v i s i b l e  u n i t s  t o  each l o b b y i s t  t h a t  may be d i s t r i b u t e d  among 
t h e  v o t e r s .  Th i s  l e a d s  t o  a  two-person, zero-sum m a t r i x  game 
whose e q u i l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n s  were used t o  approximate t h e  equ i -  
l i b r i u m  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  i n f i n i t e  lobbying  game. 
For  comparison w i t h  t h e  Shapley-Shubik and t h e  Banzhaf v a l -  
u e s  two v o t i n g  games were i n v e s t i g a t e d :  t h e  weigh ted  v o t i n g  game 
on f o u r  p l a y e r s  ( 2 , 1 , 1 , 1 )  w i t h  quota  3 ,  and t h e  weighted v o t i n g  
game on f i v e  p l a y e r s  ( 3 , l  , I ,  1 , l )  w i t h  quo t a  4 .  I n  b o t h ,  t h e  
minimal  winn ing  c o a l i t i o n s  a r e  t h e  same a s  t h e  minimal  b l o c k i n g  
c o a l i t i o n s ,  s o  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  t a c t i c a l  l o b b y i n g  game is  i n  e a c h  
c a s e  a  symmetr ic  two-person game. 
The n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  v a l u e  found f o r  t h e  same ( 2 , 1 , 1 , 1 )  
i s  ( 1 / 2 , 1 / 6 , 1 / 6 , 1 / 6 ) ,  which is  t h e  same a s  b o t h  t h e  Banzhaf 
and t h e  Shapley-Shubik v a l u e s . '  
For  t h e  game ( 3 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 )  t h e  Shapley-Shubik v a l u e  is  
( . 6 0 , . 1 0 , . 1 0 , . 1 0 , . 1 0 )  and t h e  Banzhaf v a l u e  i s  ( . 6 4 , . 0 9 , . 0 9 , . 0 9 ,  
. 0 9 ) .  For  t h i s  game t h e  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  v a l u e  i s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
( . 5 6 , . 1 1 , . 1 1 , . 1 1 , . 1 1 ) .  T h e r e  may, i n  f a c t ,  b e  more t h a n  o n e  non- 
c o o p e r a t i v e  v a l u e  f o r  t h i s  game, b u t  whe ther  any of  them c o r r e -  
sponds  t o  t h e  Shapley-Shuhik o r  t h e  Banzhaf v a l u e s  is  n o t  known. 
I n  any c a s e ,  t h e  v a l u e  t h a t  would be  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  
p l a y e r s  i n  a  v o t i n g  game by two l o b b y i s t s  compet ing f o r  t h e i r  
v o t e s  a p p e a r s  t o  be  a  new c o n c e p t  t h a t  d i f f e r s  from b o t h  t h e  
Shapley-Shubik and t h e  Banzhaf v a l u e s .  The v a l u e  i s  n o t  d e f i n e d  
f o r  a  game w i t h  a  s i n g l e  v e t o  p l a y e r  who i s  n o t  a  d i c t a t o r .  
However, we c o n j e c t u r e  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  o n l y  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which 
it d o e s  n o t  e x i s t .  The v a l u e  ( o r  v a l u e s )  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  com- 
p u t e  p r e c i s e l y  b u t  t e c h n i q u e s  e x i s t  f o r  f i n d i n g  v e r y  good 
a p p r o x i m a t i o n s .  
I t  i s  p e r h a p s  a l s o  w o r t h  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  is  a  
s i t u a t i o n ,  f o r  any game r ,  i n  which a  s o l u t i o n  i n  p u r e  s t r a t e -  
g i e s  o b t a i n s  - -namely ,  when one l o b b y i s t  h a s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  more 
r e s o u r c e s  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r .  I n  f a c t ,  i f  B  h a s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  more 
r e s o u r c e s  t h a n  A t h a t  h e  can  c o m p l e t e l y  p r e v e n t  A from s u c c e e d i n g ,  
t h e n  in t h e  l i m i t  h i s  most " e f f i c i e n t "  s t r a t e g y  1s t o  a l l o c a t e  
h i s  r e s o u r c e s  s u c h  t h a t  
1 yi = min 
'This f i n d i n g  d i s p r o v e s  a  c o n j e c t u r e  made i n  [ 7 1 ,  which i s  a n  
e a r l i e r  v e r s i o n  of [8]. 
s u b j e c t  t o  
C ~ i z a  f o r  a l l  s E s , 
i ES 
T h i s  v a l u e  t u r n s  o u t  t o  be  t h e  l e a s t  c o r e  [ 8 ] .  
F o r  b o t h  o f  t h e  w e i g h t e d  v o t i n g  games s t u d i e d  above ,  t h e  
l e a s t  c o r e  e q u a l s  t h e  n u c l e o l u s ,  which i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  
w e i g h t s .  Thus ,  it seems t h a t  a s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  
two l o b b y i s t s  change ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e s  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  
v o t e r s  a l s o  change.  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  f o r  t h e  above  two games t h e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  most  p o w e r f u l  v o t e r  i n c r e a s e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e l a t i v e  
t o  t h e  o t h e r s  a s  t h e  l o b b y i s t s '  r e s o u r c e s  a p p r o a c h  e q u a l i t y .  
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